Dividing  the  Waters:  The  California  Experience by Gray, Brian E.
Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 14
Number 1 Winter 2008 Article 41
1-1-2008
Dividing the Waters: The California Experience
Brian E. Gray
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian E. Gray, Dividing the Waters: The California Experience, 14 Hastings West Northwest J. of Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1297 (2008)
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol14/iss1/41
The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater
John D. Leshy*
I. Introduction
Groundwater is increasingly important to the nation. Groundwater
withdrawals for irrigation have tripled in the last half-century. Moreover, as
an ever-growing segment of the population get their drinking water from
public entities (62% in 1950; 85% today), the portion of public water supplies
derived from groundwater has increased from 26% to 37%.'
Groundwater nevertheless remains a subject about which
"misinformation, misunderstanding, and mysticism"2 abound, and the law
that governs it is murky.3 Most of the governing law is state law, for the
separate states have generally assumed primary responsibility for managing
the nation's groundwater.4 But "primary" does not mean "exclusive." The
federal government has a large amount of authority in this area, and has on
occasion exercised it, albeit with mixed results, as this article will discuss.
* Harry Sunderland Distinguished Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of the
Law. This paper grew out of remarks delivered in June 2004 at the 2 5'h summer
conference of the Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado School
of Law. I benefited from able research assistance by Chris Giovinazzo, a third year
student at Harvard Law School, and able editorial advice from Avinash Kar.
1. SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN
THE UNITED STATES IN 2000, CIRCULAR No. 1268, at Trends in Water Use, 1950-2000
(released March 2004, last revised May 2004), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/
circ/2004/circl268 (last updated 13 May, 2004); see also JOSEPH L. SAx, BARTON
THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES
345 (3rd ed. 2000).
2. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973)
[hereinafter WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE].
3. See generally SAx ET AL., supra note 2, at 343-459.
4. id. at 345.
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008
State law generally has not been adequate to the task of managing the
nation's groundwater. Professor Glennon has recently documented many
emerging problems, mostly stemming from inadequate state laws and
management.' As population growth, drought and the specter of climate
change are all bringing water management under new scrutiny across the
country, a fresh examination of the national government's role with respect
to groundwater seems appropriate. The first part of this essay identifies the
various ways the federal government can influence groundwater
management. Building on examples of successful federal interventions, the
second part suggests ways it should exercise that influence.
!!. Federal Authority Over Groundwater
Generally speaking, the federal government does not lack for
constitutional authority to regulate or otherwise influence groundwater
management and use. The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Sporhase v.
Nebraska' made clear that the Commerce Clause gives Congress "affirmative
power... to implement its own policies concerning [groundwaterl
regulation. .. Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Congress
has the power to deal with it on that scale."7
A. Federal reserved water rights
The Commerce Clause and the Property Clause both furnish the
national government with the authority to create federal-law-based property
rights in groundwater under the so-called Winters doctrine of federal reserved
water rights.' The issue that occasionally arises is whether, in any given
situation, this authority has been exercised. In its only brush with such a
question, the Court in 1976 decided, in Cappaert v. United States,9 that the
federal government had exercised its authority to reserve water in what
everyone agreed was an "underground pool." Oddly, the Court shrank from
5. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2002).
6. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
7. Id. at 953-54.
8. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963) (expressing "no doubt about the power of the United States
under these clauses to reserve water rights for its reservations and property").
9. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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characterizing that water as groundwater as the Ninth Circuit had", calling it
instead surface water."
Lower court post-Cappaert decisions on whether the federal
government has reserved groundwater in particular instances have not been
consistent. The Wyoming Supreme Court found no reservation in its- Big
Horn decision, 2 justifying its conclusion with a decidedly weird explanation.
It first said that "the logic which supports a reservation of surface water to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of
groundwater."'3 It then said, without further explanation, that because no final
judicial decision had accepted this logic in a holding (the Supreme Court's
dodge in Cappaert having wiped out the Ninth Circuit's decision), it would affirm
the trial court's ruling that groundwater had not been reserved here. 4
More recently, the Arizona and Montana Supreme Courts, using more
persuasive reasoning, have disagreed with Wyoming. Further, Congress
itself has acted on the assumption that at least some Indian tribes have
federally reserved rights to groundwater, because a number of
congressionally approved settlements of Indian water rights have expressly
included groundwater as well as surface water.6 Sometimes Congress has
demonstrated this assumption by doing the opposite, i.e., by expressly
authorizing the pumping of groundwater from inside a federally protected
area for use outside the reservation under certain conditions. 7
Professor Dan Tarlock concludes that while the issue is "technically
open," in his judgment "little, if any, doubt remains that Indian tribes have
groundwater as well as surface water rights."'" It is perhaps a little less
10. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).
11. 426 U.S. at 142.
12. In Re General Adjudication of Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd
by an equally divided Court sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
13. 753 P.2d at 99-100.
14. Id.
15. In Re General Adjudication of Gila River System, 195 Ariz. 411, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz.
1999), cert. denied sub nom. Phelps Dodge v. United States, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000);
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Stults, 312 Mont. 420, 59
P.3d 1093, 1099 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat.
1875 (2000); Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-34, 117
Stat. 782 (2003).
17. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460z-9(a) (2000 & Supp. 11 2003) lOregon Sand Dunes
National Recreation Areal.
18. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 9.41, at 9.80-9.80.1
(5" ed. 2002).
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clear whether this is true for other kinds of federal reservations such as
national parks. 9
Regardless of whether the federal reserved water right extends to
groundwater in any given situation, the Cappaert decision establishes the
very important principle that "the United States can protect its water from
subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater.""
The water Cappaert was pumping was clearly considered groundwater under
Nevada water law,2 and the Court curtailed his pumping to protect the
superior federal water right in the "underground pool" that was the pupfish's
sole habitat.22 At the least, then, the Court has made clear that the federal
government can create federal water rights that trump groundwater pumping
lawful under state law. Put slightly differently, when federal reserved rights
exist, federal law provides for a realistic accounting of interconnections
between groundwater and surface water, even where state law does not.23
B. Federal "non-reserved" water rights
The federal power to assert rights in groundwater does not have to be
exercised through a conventional federal reserved Winters right. For
example, Congress provided federal protection for the water-including the
groundwater-that sustains a complex sand dunes ecosystem in the Great
Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000,24 not in association with
a federal reservation of land, but through a "non-reserved" federal water
right.25 This is a right whose substantive contours are defined by federal
law, but which must be perfected through the processes of state law.26 1
have elsewhere explored the differences between this and a federal
reserved water right.27
19. See Section 11C2
20. 426 U.S. at 143.
21. Seeid. at 133-35.
22. Id. at 132.
23. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 443-46; John D. Leshy & James Belanger,
Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657, 733-38 (1988).
24. Pub. L. No. 106-530, 114 Stat. 2527; 16 U.S.C. § 4210hhh-7(b)(2)(A) (2000).
25. For more on this, see John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land
Conservation Programs: A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 271 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Id.
1326
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C. Questions about federal water rights
While the national government has the authority to create and protect
property rights in groundwater as a matter of federal law, a number of
important questions remain unanswered. For example:
1. Does the existence of a federal reservation of groundwater
depend on whether groundwater is needed to fulfill the purpose
of the reservation?
2. Could the answer be different in Indian and non-Indian contexts?
The needs of Indian and non-Indian land reservations might not
be congruent. Non-Indian federal reservations need groundwater
mostly for in situ uses, to preserve surface waters and the
ecosystems that depend on them. Indian reservations may need
groundwater not only for these uses, but also for irrigation,
municipal and industrial purposes. Dean Charlie Meyers
suggested, for example, that a national park may have no
reserved right in groundwater to meet its needs, while an Indian
tribe does.28
3. If the federal right extends to groundwater as well as surface
water, but both sources need not be relied upon to satisfy the
federal need, should one be preferred over the other? In a rare
judicial exploration of this issue, the Arizona Supreme Court
suggested looking first to surface water to satisfy Indian water
needs.29
4. Where federal and non-federal rights co-exist in a non- or
minimally recharging aquifer, how should the aquifer water be
apportioned? Does the federal right forestall any new pumping
that could interfere with the federal reservation, or should the
finite groundwater in the aquifer be shared between federal and
non-federal users on some sort of equitable basis? More than
four decades ago, the Supreme Court rejected the states'
argument for equitable apportionment of surface water between
federal and non-federal users, saying a federal land "reservation
is Inotl so much like a State that its rights to water should be
28. See Charles I. Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United
States, 13 LAND & WATERL. REV. 377, 385-89 (1978).
29. See Gila River, 195 Ariz. 411, 420-21, 989 P.2d 739, 748-49 (2001).
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determined by the doctrine of equitable apportionment. 3
Would the Court reach the same result in the groundwater
context?
5. What if non-federal pumping were already underway when the
federal reservation was created? The Cappaerts had begun
pumping only after the federal reservation was created.3 Would
the result be the same if they had been pumping first? What if
the impact of their pumping on the underground pool was not
apparent when the federal reservation was created, but became
noticeable only some time later?
6. Will the answer be governed or influenced by state law? If so, the
picture becomes even more cloudy. In a state applying the prior
appropriation doctrine to groundwater, the sequence of
appropriation may be a major factor in reconciling the federal
right with rights created under state law. Priority is, however,
irrelevant in determining rights among those who withdraw
groundwater for use on the overlying land pursuant to the
groundwater doctrines followed in many states, e.g., the rule of
capture followed in Texas,32 the American "reasonable use" rule
followed in parts of Arizona and many other states,33 and the
correlative rights doctrine followed in California.34 In these
jurisdictions (which comprise a significant majority of American
states), a latecomer may not be disadvantaged. Therefore, if the
United States reserves land that needs groundwater for in situ
use, it can make a credible case for some protection under state
law, even against pumping initiated by others prior to the
reservation."
7. Perhaps the most important of the unanswered questions is
whether the United States will have the political courage to
assert federal rights to curtail or prohibit pumping under state
law in controversial situations. In the late 1990s, a well-
connected private entrepreneur proposed to pump groundwater
near the Mojave National Preserve in southern California, and
30. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-97 (1963).
31. See426U.S. at 133.
32. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., I S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
33. See SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 371-77.
34. Id. at 377-80.
35. See discussion, infra Section liD.
1328
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market it to urban users in metropolitan Los Angeles.36 Although
that scheme, referred to as the Cadiz project, was eventually
abandoned when the Metropolitan Water District decided not to
buy the water, others are on the drawing board. For example, Las
Vegas has announced plans to pump and transport into the City
groundwater from near a National Wildlife Refuge several miles
northeast of the City." Will the federal government assert a
federal reserved right to protect groundwater necessary to
maintain the Refuge, even if it might limit one means of
supplying water to the fastest growing metropolitan area in the
country? In such situations, how realistic is it to expect the
federal government to aggressively protect the national interest
in the Refuge? If it does not, there is considerable doubt that
third parties can persuade the courts to intervene."
In hindsight, Cappaert was a rather easy case: The facts were clear about
the impact of pumping on the federal interest, an endangered species was
involved,39 and the rancher commenced pumping after the federal
government had reserved the water in the pool. Where the impacts are less
clear, the federal interest less certain, and the forces behind groundwater
pumping more politically powerful, will federal law be brought into play,
especially now that the Supreme Court has turned rightward and become
more deferential to state water law?
40
36. See generally Cadiz Groundwater Storage and Dry-Year Supply Program
(web-site sponsored by Cadiz, Inc.), at http://www.desertwater.com/ (last updated
Dec. 2003).
37. See generally the longer-range plans of the Southern Nevada Water
Authority, available at http://www.snwa.com/html/news-pubs-wrplan.html (last
visited August 21, 2004).
38. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (federal courts are reluctant to
interfere with federal agency law enforcement decisions); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v.
Reno, 56 F. 3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same, specifically with regard to assertion of
water rights claims on behalf of tribes); cf. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004) (suggesting federal courts will
scrutinize federal land management agencies' alleged failure to claim adequate water
rights to protect a national park).
39. The Endangered Species Act itself was not involved, even though the
pupfish had been listed under the Act, a fact noted by the lower courts but not the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Cappaert, 375 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (D. Nev. 1974);
United States v. Cappaert, 508 F. 2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1974).
40. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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D. United States' claims of rights to groundwater under
state law
Many states apply groundwater doctrines-principally American
reasonable use and correlative rights (but not prior appropriation)-that
give overlying landowners superior rights to groundwater against those who
pump from the same source but seek to export the water, if the overlying
landowners can show injury.41 If an aquifer lies under both federal and non-
federal lands, state law might allow the United States to protect the waters
associated with its lands against export schemes such as those in the Cadiz
or Las Vegas situations. I have suggested above that, especially outside the
Indian context, the federal interest will often be to protect groundwater in
situ to support surface ecosystems and water flows.
State law may be unclear on the extent to which it recognizes rights to
groundwater in situ, for storage or ecological purposes, and whether
ecological harm from groundwater depletion is the kind of "injury" that state
law would recognize as sufficient to curtail groundwater pumping for export.
Answering these questions in the affirmative may require stretching state
law concepts of injury, and the attitude of the Wyoming Supreme Court in
the Big Horn case42 illustrates how some state courts may be reluctant to
interpret state laws to accommodate and protect federal interests.
E. Other federal regulatory policies may affect groundwater
The most prominent of these are found in the Endangered Species
Act,43 already the trigger for several major disputes involving groundwater
pumping," and the Clean Water Act.4'
F. Federal water contracting policies may affect groundwater
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) captures, stores, and delivers,
under contract, large volumes of irrigation, municipal and industrial water
throughout the West. The "rights" to this water are determined by an untidy
amalgam of federal contract law, federal water law, and state water law.46 A
good deal of this federal reclamation project water ends up as
41. See SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 371-80.
42. See 753 P.2d 76; see also discussion, supra Section II.A.
43. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (2000 & Supp. 112003).
44. See, e.g., the Edwards Aquifer saga, recounted in SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at
367, 577-82.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. 1 2002).
46. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 651-89.
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groundwater through seepage.47 Are there' federal rights in this federally
enhanced groundwater?
The question, again, is not one of authority, but whether the federal
government has chosen to exercise it. The Supreme Court long ago decided
that the United States could recapture and reuse seepage water in a federal
reclamation project.48 Sometimes the federal government does claim rights
in the enhanced groundwater, as in the Quincy-Columbia Basin in
Washington, and the courts have agreed.49 But the United States has not
always made such claims. Indeed, some of BOR's contracts expressly
disclaim any right to groundwater recharged as a result of federally built and
operated projects.0
Many BOR contracts go even further. At the behest of the agricultural
interests it serves, BOR has often included a provision in its contracts that
any land irrigated with groundwater which "reaches the underground strata
as an unavoidable result of" irrigating lands with BOR-supplied water is not
subject to the acreage limitations of federal reclamation law. " Reclamation
law generally limits a single farmer's use of federally subsidized water to a
maximum of 960 acres; 2 the contract provision effectively allows farmers to
irrigate an unlimited amount of acres with such water, simply by pumping it
from an aquifer replenished by the federal project.
G. Federal land use policies may affect groundwater
Groundwater use that is otherwise lawful under state law may also be
affected by federal policies regarding the use of federal land.
Groundwater extraction, storage and recovery projects sometimes
require rights-of-way across federal lands. The federal government- usually
has broad discretion to grant or deny such rights-of-way. Numerous court
decisions make clear that the federal government can condition such
47. See Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wash. 2d 109,685 P.2d 1068 (1984)
48. Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 505-07 (1924). The Court did not make
clear whether that result was dictated by state or federal law or both. Although Ide
involved seepage which was recaptured while it was surface water, the same result
could obtain with groundwater.
49. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 437-46;'Jensen, 102 Wash. 2d 109; Flint v. United
States, 906 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. For a review, see SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 443-44.
51. See id. at 444 (emphasis added).
52. See 43 U.S.C. § 390dd, 96 Stat. 1265; Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of
Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 657 (1989).
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permits on steps being taken to protect federal interests." It seems clear
that the federal land manager can condition permission to use the federal
land upon an agreement by the permittee to limit groundwater pumping
that is otherwise lawful under state law.
While the law is clear, the politics are complicated, and such
conditions can be controversial. This is the groundwater version of the
"bypass flows" controversy that has, for nearly two decades, plagued Forest
Service efforts to use its land use permitting authority to protect and restore
surface water flows in the national forests which have been depleted by non-
federal diversions taking place on federal land under state water law.
4
H. Interstate Issues
The federal common law of equitable apportionment, along with
compacts and statutes that apply to interstate watercourses, may also
operate to restrict use of groundwater in a variety of circumstances." For
example, the Special Master in Arizona v. California indicated at one point that
he was prepared to enjoin additional groundwater pumping in New Mexico
where its effect would be to deplete surface water flow earmarked for senior
water right holders in Arizona.
To sum up, the federal government has potentially enormous power-
through a variety of means-to influence groundwater management
throughout the country, and especially in the West where much land is
federally owned and many stream systems contain federal reclamation water
projects.
53. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76. See also a recent case thoroughly
exploring this issue (albeit in the context of surface water rather than groundwater),
Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
54. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES
F. WILKINSON, IR.& JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW 549-52 (5th
ed. 2002).
55. See SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 692-771, esp. at 733, 753-54.
56. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 244. The Commission's
report is discussed more fully below in Section 1.B.
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I11. The Federal Role In Groundwater Policy
A. Before 1968"
With the advent of the New Deal, the national government assumed
new responsibilities in many areas of American life, substantially reworking
federal-state relations. But groundwater remained generally subject to state
control, for several reasons: First, large-scale extraction of groundwater was
not possible until the development of high-speed centrifugal pumps and
rural electrification on the eve of World War I1. Groundwater's variability
also cut sharply against national rules. Moreover, groundwater rarely had an
obvious interstate dimension that invited national involvement-which is
how the federal government assumed responsibility for such major surface
water projects as Hoover Dam. Finally, groundwater management just
lacked political sex appeal, compared to taming a wild river through some
colossal engineering achievement.
Nevertheless, more unwittingly than by design, federal policies put in
place during this era-including those promoting rural electrification and
cheap hydropower, and providing federal subsidies to a variety of
agricultural crop-would soon powerfully promote groundwater
development.58 These federal policies did not displace state control over
how groundwater was used.
This is not to say, however, that states did very much actual
management of the groundwater resource. To the contrary, with few
exceptions, the states' approach was laissez-faire-to treat groundwater
more or less as a commons, to stand aside and let pumpers have as much as
they wanted. In most places, state law purported to give landowners rights
to pump groundwater without regard to its sustainability, or to its effect on
rights to use surface water. As they worked in practice, these state
groundwater doctrines may be better understood as rules of liability than as
property rules of ownership. 9 In any event, these doctrines created an
illusion of unlimited private property rights in groundwater, when in fact the
available supply of groundwater and associated surface water was not
sufficient to satisfy such rights.
57. The material in this section is drawn from a variety of sources, including
SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 343-459; WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at
230-293; CHARLES E. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
NTIS No. PB 205-527 (1971) (background study for the National Water
Commission); and from personal observations derived from my work on these
issues over more than three decades.
58. SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 440.
59. For a discussion of this idea, see Eric Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An
Outdated Principle Beyond Its Time, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 87, 90 (2002).
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Hindsight shows this was a big mistake. Allowing unlimited pumping
and characterizing it as a property right, when combined with promotional
-federal policies, produced predictable results. Pumpers made large
investments in operations that depended on groundwater, and they came to
think they had open-ended, unlimited private property rights in the
groundwater resource. The concealed nature of the resource contributed to
this problem of inflated, unrealistic expectations. A farmer or industrial
Concern might readily appreciate the difficulty of gaining exclusive control
over a river that flows through many separately owned parcels of land. Such
appreciation may be harder to come by when water is extracted from the
bowels of the earth; even though the aquifer from which the water is
extracted may extend under many separately owned parcels of land. These
unrealistic expectations fueled the notion that the government had limited
power to regulate the withdrawal of groundwater.
As large-scale groundwater mining began to occur after World War I1,
federal policy, which was already promoting such mining, became even more
wrong-headed. Far from encouraging the states to take the longer view and
manage for sustainability, the federal government actively encouraged
groundwater mining. It even invented a new way to subsidize it, by granting
a federal tax depletion allowance to pumpers of water from the giant
Ogallala Aquifer in the High Plains, which had little natural recharge.' And
it built projects to "rescue" groundwater miners, with additional federal
subsidies. This postponed, but could not avoid, the inevitable day when
limits on groundwater had to be reckoned with.
B. A Turn to Greater Federal Involvement
Federal policy makers eventually began to wake up to the error of their
ways. A pivotal moment came in 1968, when Congress authorized federal
construction of the multi-billion dollar Central Arizona Water Project, or
CAP.6' The project that Arizona got was not the project it originally
envisioned, which was to use imported Colorado River water to expand
irrigated acreage in central Arizona. Instead, the CAP was expressly
designed to be a rescue project, and no more, for Congress prohibited CAP
60. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 30. The IRS ruling was triggered by a court
decision, United States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1965).
61. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000). The material on the events described here is
drawn from a variety of sources, including SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 692-705 and the
other sources cited there; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1987); and STEVEN C.
SCHULTE, WAYNE ASPINALL AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 177-226 (2002). As
Associate Solicitor of Interior for Energy and Resources in 1977-80, I was a bit player
in some of these events and draw upon some personal observations.
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water from being used "directly or indirectly for the irrigation of lands not
having a recent irrigation history," except for Indian land.62
Moreover, Congress wanted this to be Arizona's last federal rescue
project. By 1968 it was becoming clear that the water of the Colorado River
had been over-allocated. The Colorado was the sole source of supply for the
CAP, and both the national government and the other Basin interests
wanted to make sure Arizona would not be coming back for more Colorado
River water or another federal bailout because it had not been willing to
control groundwater mining.63 Therefore the CAP legislation specifically
forbade the Secretary of the Interior from delivering CAP water to any area in
Arizona that did not have "adequate" measures in place to "control
expansion of irrigation from aquifers affected by the irrigation in the
contract service area."6' This was a radical departure from past practice: For
the first time ever, Congress insisted on effective state groundwater law
reform as a price for getting federal largesse.
This was a rather miraculous bit of progressive policy-making. Even
more miraculously, the federal ultimatum worked. True, it remained in the
background for ten years as the CAP canal snaked its way across the Arizona
desert to the booming cities of Phoenix and Tucson. Arizona obviously was
not eager to bring up the subject, and other Basin states (perhaps figuring
they would be next to feel this kind of federal prod to reform their
groundwater management) appeared to forget about it. Then two things
happened: Cecil Andrus became Secretary of the Department of the Interior
in 1977, and Bruce Babbitt became governor of Arizona in 1978.
In a bit of drama orchestrated with the new Governor, Secretary Andrus
announced he was indeed prepared to enforce the congressional mandate to
regulate groundwater pumping. Arizona would have to abandon its Wild
West laissez-faire approach to groundwater if it wanted the Secretary to
open the spigot of the two billion dollar CAP. Babbitt then almost literally
locked key representatives of the state's big water users in his office for
many weeks of hard bargaining until they produced the 1980 groundwater
code - a detailed, complex, command-and-control reform that was anything
but laissez faire.65 All this from a state that had always stoutly resisted any
meaningful controls on groundwater pumping, that not too long before had
thrust free market apostle Barry Goldwater on the national scene, and that
62. 43 u.s.C. § 1524(a) (2000).
63. See SCHULTE, supra note 62.
64. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(c) (2000).
65. This is not to suggest the federal ultimatum was the only factor, for an
Arizona Supreme Court decision that made it difficult for cities to obtain
groundwater for urban growth also played a key role. See SAx ET AL., supra note 2, at
427-29; Desmond Connall, A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1982
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313.
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in that same year, 1980, voted overwhelmingly for Ronald Reagan-whose
anti-federal regulation views were well-known-for President.
One other important development in the evolution of national
groundwater policy occurred in 1968. It grew out of a congressional debate
over whether water might be imported into the Colorado River system from
the Columbia-Snake River system. Led by members of Congress from the
Pacific Northwest, opponents of importation prevailed. While the
legislation Congress enacted called on the Secretary of the Interior to
conduct "full and complete reconnaissance investigations for the purpose of
developing a general plan to meet the future water needs of the Western
United States," it prohibited "any Federal official" from undertaking any
study of "any plan for the importation of water into the Colorado River Basin
from any other natural river drainage basin" outside of Arizona, California,
Colorado and New Mexico.6 As a consolation prize to import proponents,
Congress seized upon a favorite tactic-it set up a commission.67 While this
National Water Commission grew out of the fight over importation, it
addressed water policy across the board, including groundwater.
The Commission's 1973 Report was aptly titled Water Policies for the
Future. It called for much more attention to be paid to economic efficiencies
(leading it to focus on project costs, water pricing, and water marketing);
equity (leading it to call for greater attention to Indian water rights); and
environmental quality (leading it to pay serious attention to the
environment-which was just beginning to become a household word in the
early 1970s).
On groundwater specifically, the Commission began by condemning
the "misinformation, misunderstanding, and mysticism" that surrounded
the subject.68 It worked hard to demystify the topic, tersely expressing its
key findings:
The three principal problems of ground water law,
management, and administration are: (1) integrating
management of surface water and ground water, (2)
depletion of ground water aquifers at rates exceeding
recharge (often referred to as the "mining" of ground water),
and (3) impairment of ground water quality. Lesser, though
important, problems are accelerating collection of
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000). The original prohibition was for ten years but it
was extended once, to 1988, and then was permitted to expire, apparently because
the Pacific Northwest members of Congress decided the big water project era was
over and the risk had passed.
67. National Water Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868; see
SCHULTE, supra note 62, at 204-07, 214.
68. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 230.
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ground water data together with fuller and more
meaningful interpretation of it, aquifer protection, and
subsidence. 9
On all three points, the Commission rather gently criticized the miserable
failure of most states to reform their laws and policies to address these
problems. For example, on the first problem, the report noted that "only
recently and in only a few water-short Western States has an effort been
made to coordinate the administration of the integrated surface water-
ground water supply."7" On the second, it noted that "[oInly a few States
have squarely faced the ... problems caused by ground water mining."7 On
the third, the Commission's criticism extended to the national government
as well; the report noted that little attention had been paid to groundwater
pollution even though it has "long-term and sometimes irreversible effects..
landl the subject is of national concern."72
Although many of the Commission's recommendations called simply
for reform of state laws and policies, at several points it recommended that
the federal government be more involved. For example:
Recommendation No. 7-6: Any Federal agency seeking
authorization of a Federal water project for an area
having a usable ground water aquifer should describe
and evaluate the ground water management programs
of the area.
Discussion- Congress should be apprised of the status of
ground water management programs in areas in which the
desirability of authorizing Federal water projects is under
consideration. Federal agency reports on proposed water
projects should contain appropriate descriptions and
evaluations of such ground water management programs so
the Congress can judge whether or not and the extent to
which progress in effective conjunctive management of
ground water and surface water is being made and, thus,
the extent to which that option is adequately considered as
an alternative to proposed Federal projects.73
69. Id. at 232.
70. Id. at 233.
71. Id. at 232.
72. Id. at 243.
73. Id. at 238.
West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
Recognizing that groundwater mining was a "national problem,"74 the
Commission openly wrestled with various alternative ways of dealing with it:
The Commission has given extended thought to the role of
the Federal Government in discouraging ground water
mining and promoting prudent aquifer management. One
possibility is preemptive Federal regulation. The
Commission rejects this alternative because it does not think
the problem is capable of a single solution and questions
the likelihood of a Federal agency developing multiple
solutions adaptable to a variety of local conditions. 5
At the same time, the Commission was clear-eyed about the federal
government's "direct financial interest in ground water mining when a region
suffering from overdraft seeks a rescue operation.""
Based on this reasoning, the Commission made the following
recommendations:
Recommendation No. 7-8: The President should issue
an executive order directing Federal agencies charged
with responsibility of water resource planning and
development to include in all pertinent studies and
project proposals a description of the ground water
resource, whether or not ground water is being mined
and, if so, the regulatory and management regime
applicable to it, together with an evaluation of that
regime.
Recommendation No. 7-9: Congress should scrutinize
closely the economic justification for water supply
projects designed to supply supplementary water to
areas that have mined ground water and should examine
the circumstances giving rise to the project proposal
including the presence or absence of ground water
regulation and management, and their operation.77
The Commission also recognized the potential seriousness of
groun'dwater pollution, and acknowledged an important federal role there
too. It called for (1) more funding for the U.S. Geological Survey to study
74. Id. at 242.
75. Id.
76. id.
77. Id.
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and monitor groundwater quality; (2) the federal government to take into
account state and local efforts to protect pertinent groundwater quality in
considering any federal water supply project; and (3) federal clean water
legislation to cover groundwater pollution through the same "regulatory
regime and enforcement techniques," applied to surface water."
Finally, the Commission addressed what it called the "central and
pervasive problem" of the lack of basic pertinent information about
groundwater, including its availability and its connection with surface
flows.7 9 It noted that data are "relatively difficult to obtain, costly, and
usually less precise than comparable data about the water that is visible at
the earth's surface."' 8 The Commission did not mince words: it called the
data shortcomings "potentially disastrous," and made rather detailed
recommendations for how the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) should be
adequately funded to gather specific data on significant aquifer systems and
report the results to Federal, State and local officials (including, specifically,
state and federal courts).8' The Commission also advocated that the
national Water Resources Council (since deauthorized) use the USGS data
to "formulate recommendations for improved ground water management
practices and transmit its recommendations to appropriate Federal, State,
and local officials.
'8 2
In short, the Commission proclaimed that the era of promoting the use
of groundwater without adequate regulation was, or ought to be, over, and
that more active, effective management of this vital resource was necessary.
It called on States to do a much better job of managing and regulating, and
while it rejected a top-down federal approach (except to protect ground
water quality), it called for federal policies that actively promoted rather
than postponed solutions to these problems. It was a remarkably able and
prescient report, and it is noteworthy that westerners with substantial
experience in state-level water management (in Arizona, Montana, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington) dominated its membership. 3 Coming on the heels
78. Id. at 243-44 (Recommendations Nos. 7-10, 7-14, 7-15).
79. Id. at 245.
80. Id.
81. Id. (Recommendations Nos.7-16 through 7-20).
82. Id. (Recommendation No. 7-19).
83. The Chair, Charles Luce, had been a prominent attorney from Washington
State, general counsel to an Indian tribe, Administrator of the Bonneville Power
Administration, and Undersecretary of the Interior under Stewart Udall; the other six
members were Howard Appling (a former Oregon state official who had worked in the
agricultural industry), lames Ellis (attorney from Seattle with extensive experience in
state and local government issues), Roger Ernst (former Arizona state engineer,
water commissioner, land commissioner and water district official),. Ray K. Linsley
(Engineering Professor at Stanford and consultant to state and federal agencies),
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of the 1968 CAP legislation, it pointed the way toward better groundwater
management, with the federal government playing a constructive role.
C. The Current Scenario
It is, frankly, a pity that the Commission's recommendations have
mostly not been implemented. Delay in addressing these issues is costly, as
economies increasingly rely on unsustainable water practices and
expectations harden in resistance to change. As the Commission itself
noted with respect to the integration of ground and surface water
management, "when the coordination effort comes late-after an economy
has been developed in reliance on two different legal systems for one
integrated supply-achieving coordinated administration is very difficult." 4
But the Commission's recommendations remain viable. This was
demonstrated when, a quarter-century later, another congressionally
chartered blue-ribbon commission revisited western water management.
The 1998 report of this Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission
essentially updated and refined much of the work of its predecessor,
reaffirming its key conclusions. Among other things, the new Commission
recommended that Congress "require state ... regulation of [groundwater
withdrawals as a condition of federal financial assistance for the
construction of new water storage projects." 8 It also asked Congress to
"scrutinize proposals for water projects in areas with groundwater mining,
especially noting the presence or absence of groundwater regulation and
management."8 Finally, it called on all federal agencies with responsibilities
in the water area to be aware of "associated groundwater resources and
their current management, including ... rates of depletion."87
'Now, fast-forward five more years, to the Bush Administration's major
water policy pronouncement, Water 2025.8 It contains some nice rhetoric
and has some sensible, constructive elements. But on groundwater, the
Administration is basically missing in action.
James E. Murphy (Montana attorney active on water issues at the state and interstate
level), and Josiah Wheat (Texas attorney and state and water district official). WATER
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at iv-v. Its staff and consultants included many
westerners experienced in state water management systems. Id. at vii.
84. Id. at 233.
85. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST: THE
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, p. 6-23 (1998).
86. id.
87. Id.
88. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Water 2025: Providing Water for the West, at
http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/water2025 (last updated June 21, 2004).
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
For example, Water 2025 does not identify groundwater depletion as a
priority water management problem in the west. It does not mention the
problem of ignoring connections between groundwater and surface water.
And it does not include improved groundwater management or
replenishment in its tool kit. Indeed, its only statement on the subject is the
tepid promise that the U.S. Geological Survey "will enhance groundwater
monitoring.., in critical areas of the West." 9
One does not have to look too far for an explanation of the Bush
Administration's modesty. Its policy is replete with statements like these:
- "Since 1866, federal water law and policy has deferred to states in
the allocation and administration of water within their boundaries.
This policy will be honored and enhanced by Water 2025."
- Decisions to address "the complex water needs of the West...
cannot and should not be driven from the federal level."
- "Water 2025 can only work if it is implemented in accordance with
state law."
While the Administration at least acknowledged that the federal government
"built many of the water storage and delivery systems in the arid west,"' its
virtual silence on groundwater, and its zeal to respect state law, assumes
that states will solve groundwater problems by themselves. Experience
does not support this assumption.
Groundwater mining, for example, is fundamentally created by and
tolerated through state law. The artificial bifurcation between groundwater
and surface water is a problem solely created by state law, because it is not
tolerated in federal law, as the Cappaert decision illustrates. 92 Arizona's pre-
CAP experience is typical-when states are given absolute supremacy over
groundwater management, the result in many places will be continued
relentless mining of groundwater and the destruction of dwindling supplies
of riparian habitat so that, over time, groundwater depletion reaches crisis
proportions, both for water supply and for aquatic ecosystems. There are
many other examples. 93
89. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND
CONFLICT IN THE WEST 18, available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water2025.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
90. Id. at 1-3.
91. Id. at 11.
92. See, discussion, supra Section II.A.
93. Consider the State of Wyoming's failure to address the problem of
disposing of vast quantities of groundwater that are pumped in coal bed methane
extraction. GARY BRYNER, COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST
13-16 (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, 2002),
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Although groundwater in much of the United States is not being
managed very well, states will continue to have a primary role in its
management. Unilateral, top-down federal solutions are no more likely to
be adopted or to work here than in any other aspect of water policy. But as
the National Water Commission recognized, the federal government has a
constructive role to play. The Arizona experience shows how it can
encourage and sometimes even require states to do better. Unfortunately,
Water 2025 seems to ignore that approach, making it a missed opportunity to
improve management of a vital natural resource.
Water 2025 also reflects federal fiscal shortsightedness. Again, the
National Water Commission saw the problem clearly, recognizing that
groundwater mining is of national concern, not so much from the fact that
the resource may be ultimately depleted, although that is a problem, but
from the fact that the depletion is unplanned, and the future is not provided
for. As disaster approaches, the Federal Government is likely to be implored
to step in with a .rescue project, to furnish a supplementary water supply at
taxpayers' expense to save an economy established in reliance on imprudent
overuse of groundwater.94
available at http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/publications/CBMPrimer.pdf
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004). See also, JOSHUA SKOV & NANCY MYERS, EASY MONEY, HIDDEN
COSTS: APPLYING PRECAUTIONARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO COALBED METHANE IN THE POWDER
RIVER BASIN (Science and Environmental Health Network, June 2004), available at
www.sehn.org/pdf/cbm.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). This report estimates that coal
bed methane development could pump 40 million acre-feet of groundwater, causing
a several hundred-foot drop in the water table and affecting 5000 water wells.
Consider also Nevada's limited and mostly ineffectual response to huge groundwater
withdrawals associated with hard-rock mining-a one million acre-feet draw-down in
the Humboldt Basin in Nevada alone. one, the Barrick Goldstrike mine, pumps about
80,000 acre-feet a year from its pit, and when it backfills after mining ceases it will likely
severely reduce surface flows in the Humboldt River to create the second largest
reservoir (after Lake Mead) in Nevada. See, e.g., SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 361-62.
94. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 232. Of course, even when a
state has a groundwater management scheme in place that adequately. addresses
how shortfalls in supply should be allocated, it may still come to the federal
government for assistance. Thus, Idaho agricultural interests have been exploring
how they might obtain federal funds to ameliorate pain caused by applying Idaho's
priority system to curtail groundwater pumping by farmers in order to protect senior
water rights in surface springs and the Snake River. See Jennifer Sandmann, Idaho
Debates Idling Farms for Spring Water, THE TIMES-NEWS (Twin Falls, Idaho), August 19,
2004 (on file with West-Northwest) (originally accessed at http://www.magicvalley.com);
Rocky Barker, Idaho Farmer May Be Asked to Dry Up 100,000 Acres, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept.
3, 2004, Local Section, at 6.
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IV. An Appropriate Federal Role
Arizona is managing its groundwater much better than it was before
the federal government helped engineer its reform. The Arizona
experience suggests the right path for federal policy-to use a mixture of
information-gathering, carrots (federal dollars), sticks (federal claims of
water rights and enforcement of federal regulatory laws like the
Endangered Species Act), and persuasion (conditions in federal
reclamation contracts and federal land use permits) to move the states
toward more active management of groundwater.
As the National Water Commission emphasized, an essential step is
simply gathering information. The U.S. Geological Survey operates about
7200 stream-flow gauges around the country, and in my experience, its
support role in this regard is widely accepted. But the states have never
advocated for-indeed, they may have quietly resisted-a comparable
federal role in groundwater. I believe this is because of their concern that
federal information-gathering will ultimately lead to federal displacement of
their primacy over groundwater. This extreme short-sightedness has
resulted in a great disparity in the amount of federal dollars invested in
assessing and monitoring aquifers compared to their importance to the
nation in supplying drinking water for a large proportion of the country.9
In much of the West, the federal government operates a giant
plumbing system of storage and delivery projects.96 This system has great
potential for facilitating groundwater banking, which is emerging as an
essential tool for progressive water management in many areas. 97 Moreover,
the federal government's power to contract for the use of this water,
including when it seeps into aquifers, gives clear opportunity to promote
better management of groundwater, including restoration of associated
stream systems.
98
The assertion of federal claims to groundwater may sometimes lead to
negotiated settlements that improve management of groundwater and related
surface water with benefits to non-federal as well as federal interests. Around
the Lummi Indian Reservation north of Seattle, where Indians and a rapidly
growing number of non-Indians pump groundwater from a common pool, and
salt water intrusion from nearby Puget Sound threatens all, federal claims to
groundwater on behalf of the Indians can help forge a solution to the common
95. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES, available
at http://water.usgs.gov/programs.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2004).
96. See SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 651-57.
97. See id. at 431-59. See also several reports on conjunctive use prepared by
The Natural Heritage Institute, found at http://www.n-h-i.org/Projects/
WaterResources/ConjUse/ConjunctiveUse.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
98. Id.
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problem by forcing non-Indians to the negotiating table." Elsewhere, federal
claims to groundwater may help spur states to manage water in a way that
acknowledges the interface between ground and surface water.' °
Sometimes the federal prod may not be needed. Colorado has
developed, without overt federal intervention, a sophisticated system of
managing groundwater and surface water in an integrated way that puts it
miles ahead of any other western state."' The threat of salinity intrusion and
aquifer contamination along Southern California's coastal plain has led to
some remarkably sophisticated groundwater management there, again
without significant federal involvement.0 2 (But California is schizophrenic-
in its great Central Valley there is precious little management of
groundwater. 3 ) Land subsidence around Houston from unregulated
groundwater pumping led to some modest legal reform, at least on paper, of
Texas's wild and woolly rule of capture-the "absolute ownership in the
landowner" principle of groundwater law.0 4
But looking across the entire landscape, progress without federal
prodding is more the exception than the rule. In most places the federal
government is needed, as in Central Arizona, to be a catalyst for constructive
change in groundwater management. Its tough stance there was driven by
interstate politics, uncharacteristic federal fiscal prudence, and progressive
leadership. A more common rationale for more recent federal intervention
in state groundwater management has been to preserve biodiversity.
Consider the Edwards Aquifer in south-central Texas. Even as pumping
from this vital supply (the sole source of water for the Nation's ninth largest
city, San Antonio) increased dramatically, Texas stubbornly resisted
regulation. The aquifer discharges into some springs which support several
endangered species listed and protected under federal law. Litigation to
enforce that law eventually, if slowly, led Texas to begin to come to grips
99. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 862-63.
100. See the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in the Gila River Adjudication
case, supra note 16, recognizing a federal reserved right to groundwater, and its
closely related decision, In re General Adjudication of Gila River System, 198 Ariz. 330, 334,
9 P.3d 1069, 1073 (2000), recognizing a test for defining sub-flow of surface water that
"comports with hydrological reality, as it is currently understood."
101. See, e.g., SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 361, 401-402.
102. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 446-59; See WILLIAM BLOMOUIsT, DIVIDING THE
WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
103. SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 458.
104. See Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21
(Tex. 1978); SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 367, 430-31.
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with managing the aquifer to protect not only the species' future, but also
that of one of its great cities."5
Much the same thing is happening on the Platte River, where
endangered species concerns are driving Colorado, Nebraska and Wyoming
toward better management of the River and its associated aquifers. A recent
editorial in the Denver Post underscored the importance of the federal
government driving the solution, and noted that the endangered species
concerns are forcing Nebraska to stop "ignorling] the physical reality that
excessive pumping of shallow aquifers near a river reduces the river's water
levels .. . [which is a] big problem on the Platte."'06
A final example involves the San Pedro, a small desert river in
southern Arizona, pleasant enough to the untrained eye but spectacular to
biologists and bird-watchers-a remnant of pre-settlement Arizona, before
groundwater pumping and surface diversions dried up nearly all Arizona's
major rivers."' The San Pedro corridor is one of the largest surviving
expanses of southwestern cottonwood-willow riparian forests, and is
important habitat for millions of migratory birds, making it a world-class
showcase of biological diversity. Birder's Digest named the area the premier
birdwatching site in the country."8
It is an international stream, arising in Mexico and flowing northward
into Arizona where it eventually joins the Gila River. The San Pedro sits atop
a large aquifer that contains perhaps 50 million acre-feet of water. Nearby
are an army base, Fort Huachuca, and one of Arizona's fastest growing cities,
Sierra Vista. The City, the Army, farmers, and others all pump groundwater.
The pumping aims a loaded gun at the stream-flow and the riparian corridor.
The resulting overdraft will, unless checked, inexorably extinguish the
stream and its rich riparian habitat. State law has been inadequate to
protect the riparian corridor because the State has been slow to recognize
the connection between groundwater and surface water, and because the
area is outside the primary regulatory ambit of the 1980 groundwater code."°
105. See, e.g., SAX ETAL., supra note 2, at 577-82; GLENNON, supra note 6, at 87-97.
106. Editorial, A Solution on Platte River Fight, DENVER POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at B7,
available at 2004 WL 59330297. See also Bureau of Reclamation, Platte River Recovery
Program EIS, at http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/groundwater/allproiects/platte-river.htm
(last updated July I, 2003).
107. The facts referred to in the discussion of the San Pedro are derived
generally from GLENNON, supra note 6; see also COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, RIBBON
OF LIFE: AN AGENDA FOR PRESERVING TRANSBOUNDARY MIGRATORY BIRD HABITAT ON THE
UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (1999) [hereinafter RIBBON OF LIFE], available at
http://www.cec.org/pubs-docs/documents/index.cfm?varlan=english&lD=283 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2004).
108. See GLENNON, supra note 6, at 51-69.
109. See, e.g., RIBBON OF LIFE, supra note 108.
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Formerly in private hands, the legacy of a Mexican land grant, the
riparian corridor is now in federal ownership as a result of a three-way
state/private/federal trade engineered by then-Governor Babbitt in the mid-
1980s. In 1988, Congress made it the nation's first Riparian National
Conservation Area, and it is now part of the Bureau of Land Management's
National Landscape Conservation System."'
The federal legislation expressly reserves water as a matter of federal
law to protect the riparian corridor. It also contains the unusual command
to the Secretary of the Interior to "take steps necessary to protect"
federally reserved water rights, including "filing . . . a claim for the
quantification of such rights in any present or future appropriate stream
adjudications."'.. The federal right has been asserted in the massive Gila
River general stream adjudication (filed a quarter of a century ago), but the
proceedings are going forward at a glacial pace."2 Still, the federal water
rights, the presence of endangered. species and Fort Huachuca make the
national government a major player in, and a proponent of, protecting the
stream and riparian corridor.
Apparently frustrated with the pace of the adjudication, last year
Congress stepped in again, with a little-noticed provision buried in the 2004
National Defense Authorization Act." 3 On the one hand, it clarified that the
consultation process of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act did not
require consideration of water consumption by non-federal entities outside
Fort Huachuca, in determining whether federal groundwater pumping would
be likely to jeopardize endangered species.' 4 On the other hand, and more
important, it directed the Secretary of the Interior to "prepare... a report on
water use management and conservation measures that have been
implemented and are needed to restore and maintain the sustainable yield
of the regional aquifer by and after September 30, 2011."' The report, due
by the end of this calendar year, is to:
set forth measurable annual goals for the reduction of the
overdrafts of the groundwater of the regional aquifer, to
identify specific water use management and conservation
measures to facilitate the achievement of such goals, and
to identify impediments in current Federal, State, and local
laws that hinder efforts ... to mitigate water usage in order
110. See 16 U.S.C. § 460xx-6 (2000) [San Pedro Riparian National
Conservation Area l.
111. 1Id. §460xx- I(d).
112. See supra note 101.
113. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 321, 117 Stat. 1392, 1437-39 (2003).
114. Id. § 321(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 1437.
115. Id.6321(c)(1), 17Stat, at 1438.
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to restore and maintain the sustainable yield of the
regional aquifer by and after September 30, 2011.116
The report is supposed to set out the "net quantity of water withdrawn
from and recharged to the regional aquifer" in the most recent one-year
period,"7 identify annual overdraft reduction goals each year from 2005
through 2011 "to achieve sustainable yield,""' and contain an "allocation of
responsibility for the achievement of such reduction among" water users in
the basin."9 It must also address monitoring and verification activities, and
provide for annual progress reports. 21 While Congress did not mandate that
the recommendations in the report be implemented as a matter of federal
law, it expressed the "sense of Congress" that "any future appropriations"
of federal money to the local water management partnership "should take
into account whether the partnership has met its annual goals for
overdraft reduction. ' 2
Here, Congress has combined the carrot and the stick. Interestingly,
it does not rely on federal claims of water rights, even though the San
Pedro has an express federal water right. The "stick" of choice here is
instead the threat of enforcement of federal regulatory laws like the ESA.
This may be because the ESA is so powerful where listed endangered
species are affected 2  or perhaps because the process of identifying,
adjudicating, and enforcing Winters rights is so long, complex and
expensive. The San Pedro experience also suggests that the assertion of a
Winters property right may be less politically palatable to state and local
interests than the assertion of federal regulatory authority. Indeed, the
Winters doctrine-the principal basis for federal water rights-has long
caused substantial state discomfiture. 23 It may be that in some, perhaps
many circumstances, states may be more accepting of federal regulation
than they are of federal assertion of property rights in natural resources
they see as within their purview.
116. Id. 321(c)(2), 117Stat. at 1438.
117. Id. § 321(c)(3)(A), 117 Stat. at 1438.
118. Id. § 321(c)(3)(B), 117 Stat. at 1438.
119. Id. § 321(c)(3)(C), 117 Stat. at 1438.
120. Id. § 321(d), 117 Stat. at 1438-39.
121. ld.§321(f), l17Stat. at 1439.
122. In many situations there may be enough of a federal connection to
groundwater overdraft to trigger the ESA section 7 consultation process. This can be
a more accessible tool than the direct enforcement of "take" of endangered species
under section 9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
123. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 781-866, esp. 815-17.
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Finally, the San Pedro may also illustrate, in the end, that solutions
may not come easily. The ESA may drive the process, but ultimately further
federal carrots might be necessary, in the form of funds for measurement
and scientific modeling, for conservation, for water reuse, and for plumbing
facilities both to better manage local supplies and, possibly, to import
supplies from outside.
V. Conclusion
As Aldous Huxley said, facts do not cease to exist simply because they
are ignored.'24 The nation and its constituent states have not fully faced up
to serious groundwater problems. Robert Glennon's stories of depletion of
groundwater and associated surface water are grim reminders of a resource
in trouble.'25  Droughts of recent years-possibly long-term, possibly
exacerbated by humanly induced climate change-is leading to more
groundwater extraction, more depletion, and more adverse effects on
surface water rights and ecosystems.
Grappling with these questions is not easy. Groundwater management
can be staggeringly complex, as anyone can attest who has ever waded
through page after page of mind-numbing detail in the Arizona groundwater
code,'26 or struggled with the definition of "not-nontributary groundwater"
along Colorado's Front Range.' While the scientific, technical and legal
challenges are daunting, there is room for optimism, if the federal
government is willing to assume a more active role. There is much at stake.
124. Aldous Huxley, A Note on Dogma, in PROPER STUDIES 205 (1927). The
quotation is available at http://www.quotationspage.com/subjects/facts (last visited
Nov. 22, 2004).
125. GLENNON, supra note 6, passim.
126. See sources cited in SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 428.
127. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-90-103(10.7) (2004); SAX ETAL., supra note 2,
at 361.
